yalibnan.

President Obama said that what happens in Lebanon has an impact far beyond its borders
Note: Can it get any worse? Oh, I'm sure it can, very shortly! Bee Sting
Last week in Damascus, just days after the highest ranking visit from a U.S. official in years, Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted a state dinner for his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmedinajad. Welcoming Ahmedinajad so close on the heels of the U.S. diplomatic good will gesture was a pointed Syrian slight to the Obama administration, but the icing on the cake was Assad’s other guest of honor at the feast: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
For Damascus and Tehran—the last two U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East—Hezbollah has long constituted a strategic asset and a point of pride. More recently, the organization successfully worked to broaden its appeal throughout the region. And indeed, after the Shiite terrorist organization fought Israel to a standstill in 2006, Hezbollah’s stature in the Arab world skyrocketed. Not only was Nasrallah the most compelling Arabic orator, Hezbollah became the most positive personification of Shiites in the largely Sunni Muslim region.
That was 2006. Today, while Hezbollah remains a formidable “resistance” force, in the past two years, a number of setbacks have tarnished the organization’s carefully cultivated image in Lebanon and the broader Arab world. Hezbollah’s military prowess may not be in doubt, but now for the first time, Lebanese and other Middle Easterners are starting to question the organization’s once unscrupulous morality. Nearly three decades after its establishment, the resistance has institutionalized and bureaucratized, and Hezbollah is starting to resemble other, corrupt Lebanese organizations.
The problems of the Party of God, Hezbollah's English translation, started in May 2008, when the militia violated its cardinal rule and turned its weapons—allegedly intended for use against Israel—on Lebanese citizens, when the organization invaded Beirut. Continuing this trend, three months later the militia opened fire (accidentally, Hezbollah says) on a Lebanese army helicopter, killing the co-pilot. Then, in November 2008, a 49-member Hezbollah cell was arrested in Egypt, accused of plotting attacks against Israeli tourists and Suez Canal shipping. (Nasrallah responded to the arrests by publicly calling on Egyptians to topple their government).
Setbacks continued into 2009. First came a damaging report in the May edition of Der Spiegel, implicating the militia in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri. (These allegations were recently confirmed by Le Monde). A month later, the heavily favored militia lost the Lebanese elections to its pro-West rivals.
Adding insult to injury, less than a week after its defeat at the polls, the organization was dealt yet another blow, when mass demonstrations erupted in Iran protesting the fraudulent elections. The rallies challenged Iran’s clerical leadership and its controversial doctrine of velayat-e faqih (Islamic government), threatening the seat of power of Hezbollah’s spiritual leader and financial patron Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
As if this weren’t enough, in September 2009 one of the militia’s chief local financiers, Salah Ezzedin, went bankrupt in a Ponzi scheme, ala Bernard Madoff. Ezzedin, who had promised rates of return up to 80 percent, ended up swindling 10,000 Lebanese Shiites out of an estimated $300 million.
Among the setbacks of the past two years, the Ezzedin scandal was perhaps the most damaging to Hezbollah because the militia’s leadership was so close to the disgraced financier, a relationship that led many investors to trust him with their money. (Indeed, Ezzedin named his publishing house after Nasrallah’s son, Hadi, who was killed by Israel in 1997). The Ezzedin affair implicated Hezbollah in the same kind of corruption it routinely accused the pro-West Sunni Government in Beirut of perpetrating.
Recognizing the implications for the organization’s reputation, Hezbollah went into damage-control mode. Nasrallah repeatedly denied any connection to the affair, claiming that the party itself lost $4 million. According to the Arabic news service Elaph, he also instructed Hezbollah clerics to issue a “fatwa-like” directive forbidding the mention of the militia in connection to the scandal, lest it provide fodder for Israeli and American propaganda machines to further “besmirch the organization’s name.”
But the damage was already done. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s long suffering detractors were giddy with schadenfreude; meanwhile, many of the organization’s supporters expressed profound disappointment.
One article in the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily Al-Akbar, written by the paper’s editor Ibrahim al Amin shortly after the scandal broke, provides a good picture of the sentiment of Hezbollah’s base. Al Amin accused the organization of going soft after decades of hardship and of starting to live the good life corrupted by “greed.” This cultured lifestyle, he wrote, was “in opposition to the principle of sacrifice” that once was the hallmark of the resistance. Ending with a flourish, al Amin cited the famed Israeli Ministry of Defense advisor on Lebanon, Uri Lubrani, who long ago said that Israel would only defeat Hezbollah “when it became infected with the virus of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon, in other words, when it alters its appearance and becomes bourgeoisie.”
It’s less clear how this scandal and other Hezbollah missteps are impacting the organization’s standing throughout the Arab world. While much of the regional polling is unreliable, it does reveal some trends. Pew polls taken in 2007 and 2009 indicate consistently high levels of Shiite confidence in Nasrallah, reaching 97 percent in 2009. During this same two year period, however, Sunni Muslim confidence in Seyyid Hasan dropped from an already low 9 percent to 2 percent. (The same 2009 poll showed a decline from 2007 in favorable views of the organization among Egyptians, Jordanians, and Palestinians). Other polls of Arabs also suggest a decline in support. According to polls conducted by Zogby International, in 2008 Nasrallah was the top vote-getter (at 27 percent) when Arabs were asked about their most admired foreign leader. In 2009—even prior to the Ezzedin affair—he only received 11 percent
Although difficult to prove, both based on the public opinion polling and anecdotal evidence, it appears that the last two years have undercut some of Hezbollah’s hard-won currency in the region. Of course, public opinion is fickle, and there is little doubt that the militia’s popularity would increase if another round of fighting erupted between the organization and Israel. During the summer war of 2006, for example, over a 33-day period, Hezbollah’s al-Manar satellite station viewership soared from 38 in the rankings into the top ten.
Still, recent actions by Hezbollah suggest that the organization is concerned with its image in Lebanon and the Arab world. In November, two months after the scandal broke, for example, Nasrallah changed the topic and published a new Hezbollah “manifesto,” updating the 1985 charter. Like the previous document, the 2009 manifesto spelled out its enmity toward Israel and the United States. At the same time, though, the new charter sought to appeal to a broader Sunni audience by downplaying the organization’s historic allegiance to the clerical leadership in Tehran. Likewise, rather than urging Lebanese Christians to convert—“We call upon you to embrace Islam” read the 1985 manifesto—in 2009, Hezbollah adopted more conciliatory language toward its fellow countrymen.
Likewise, in December, to counter the growing impression of Hezbollah corruption, Nasrallah gave a speech promoting (of all things) adherence to Lebanese laws, including respecting traffic signals, paying for—and not stealing—Government water and electricity, abiding by building laws and civil codes, ending smuggling that undercuts Lebanese businesses, and emphasizing the importance of civil servants showing up for their jobs and actually performing their duties
This past February, the resistance really put the spin machine into full gear. First, in a speech during “Martyred Leaders Week,” Nasrallah—in an obvious bid to regain his standing with the Arab street—pledged that during the next war with Israel, Hezbollah would go toe-to-toe with Israel, threatening to “bomb Ben Gurion airport,” if the Jewish state targeted Beirut International.
Then, following the martyrs speech, Hezbollah’s website published a bazaar interview with Lebanese “economists” claiming that by establishing a credible deterrent threat, the Shiite militia had actually “improved [the] economic situation in Lebanon,” particularly the performance of the Beirut Stock Exchange. Not coincidentally, at about the same time, Al-Akbar publicized a poll by the pro-Hezbollah Beirut Center for Research and Information, indicating that 84 percent of Lebanese “trust the resistances’ capabilities facing any Israeli attack.”
The final piece of the puzzle in Hezbollah’s effort to rehabilitate its image at home and abroad is compensation for the victims of the Ezzedin Ponzi scheme. Because Hezbollah was so close to the financier, swindled Shiites—most of whom are supporters of the resistance—are petitioning the organization for financial restitution. And it’s not only the Lebanese. According to reports in the Arab press, several leading figures in Syria’s Assad regime, including Assad’s brother Maher and Vice President Farouk Shara’a also lost their investments, and are looking to Hezbollah—which captured Ezzedin on the lam with suitcases of cash in hand—to recoup some 17 million euros.
Not surprisingly, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyasa reported on February 28 that some time ago Nasrallah had contacted Supreme Leader Khamenei, requesting $300 million in funding to stave off a “crisis of confidence” among his constituents. Khamenei approved the appeal, and according to Al-Siyasa, the funds were transferred to Nasrallah by Ahmedinajad when they met in Damascus last week.
With money in hand, Hezballah will be able to placate its supporters. By threatening Israel, the militia may even be able to again generate some buzz in the Arab world. What the last two years have demonstrated, however, is that if the “resistance” isn’t resisting (i.e., actively fighting) Israel, the Arab world has little use for the militia, particularly if it is attacking Sunnis at home and subverting Arab regimes abroad.
During the dinner in Damascus for Ahmedinajad and Nasrallah last week, Assad pledged his regime’s continued backing for Hezbollah. “To support the resistance is a moral, patriotic and legal duty,” he said. Four years after the last war with Israel and a following a string of Hezbollah miscues, although the Shiite militia dominates Lebanese politics, Assad’s sentiments today appear to be shared by a minority of Middle Easterners. While the organization is making great efforts to reverse the tide, absent another war with Israel, the decline of Arab support for Hezbollah is a regional trend that’s likely to continue.
David Schenker is Aufzien Fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
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A senior adviser to US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Jeffrey D. Feltman, said on Sunday in an interview with Al-Hayat that he is concerned about hostilities breaking out between Israel and Lebanon.
According to Feltman, while the US government has no specific evidence about such a possibility, he is worried about reports of arms flowing to Hizbullah.
The senior US diplomat said that Washington contends that the weaponry is arriving into southern Lebanon in violation of UN resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
Note: He's "worried about reports of arms flowing to Hizbullah" but not worried about the arms and military training of the Palestinians in the West Bank!!! Hypocrisy shines its light on our government when it comes to who is arming who, all being enemies of Israel! BeeSting
legally responsible for the false fabrications it issued against the party." The movement called on Der Spiegel's management "not to be a cheap tool manipulated by the Zionist entity to cover up for its crimes in Lebanon and Palestine." Hezbollah also called on the magazine "to be a true reflection of reality that reveals the injustice suffered by the Lebanese and Palestinian people." Note: Photo of Hezbollah added by BeeSting | ||
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by Michael Rubin
1st part of 2
The Obama administration would like to move
Key points in this Outlook:
* The Lebanese and Israeli border is calmer today than during the 2006 war, but the potential for regional conflict is great.
* Both the Syrian and Iranian governments have used Hezbollah to conduct proxy warfare against
* The Obama administration has tried to move
The 2006 war between
north.
While Arab governments remained conspicuously silent, unwilling to support Hezbollah publicly, if at all, Iranian authorities egged on the militia. Speaking six days after the war began, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, the speaker of
United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1701 restored calm, but only a tenuous one. While the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) returned to
The Obama administration, meanwhile, has reached out diplomatically to both
A Proxy Is Born
Hezbollah formed against the backdrop of
After the Israeli invasion of
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) supported the new group as it fought or co-opted other Shia militias in southern
Correspondent Manal Lufti described Akhtari as "the operational father" of Hezbollah, "engineer of the special relationship" between Syria and Iran, and "coordinator of Iran's relations with Palestinian organizations in Damascus," groups listed annually as terrorist organizations in the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism.[5] Indeed, according to Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, "the Iranian embassy in Damascus became the most important Ira-nian embassy in the world. It represented something akin to a 'regional center' for Iran's diplomatic activities that extended from Damascus to Beirut and the Palestinian territories and became privy to files on several matters, chief of which was Iran's relations with Syria, Hezbollah, [and] the Palestinian organizations."[6]
Hezbollah thrived under Syrian occupation. Both the Syrian and Iranian governments used Hezbollah to conduct proxy warfare against
The Syrian government not only turned a blind eye toward the group's activities in
The Israel Defense Forces' failure to eradicate Hezbollah in the 2006 war led many analysts to declare Hezbollah the victor.[14] Hezbollah had survived Israel's onslaught and become the first Arab entity to hit Haifa since Israel's founding in 1948.[15] Robert G. Rabil, director of graduate studies at Florida Atlantic University and a well-regarded Syria and Lebanon analyst, went further, suggesting that Hezbollah's rise may have come at Syria's expense.[16]
Michael Rubin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors../..
The arms trade continues through
Hezbollah is not the only recipient of Iranian largesse on Syrian territory. Matthew Levitt, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) terror and financial analyst, noted in congressional testimony that estimates of Iranian assistance to Hamas ranged between $20 million and $50 million each year through the 1990s.[24] Much of this money was and still is channeled through Hezbollah.[25] Upon Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's death in 2004, for example, Iranian intelligence reportedly channeled $22 million through Hezbollah to fund Palestinian terrorist groups more sympathetic to the Iranian line.[26]
The assassination of Hezbollah terrorist Imad Mughniyeh in
Desire to make progress on the Middle East peace process, unravel the Syria-Iran axis, and end Syrian support for terrorism motivates the Obama administration's efforts to flip Syria diplomatically from its role as a rejectionist state into the more moderate camp populated by countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan, which may not always be pro-American in the expression of their foreign policy, but at least keep their support for terrorism indirect and do not countenance Iranian influence.[29]
There is no evidence, however, that the State Department's engagement policy has worked. Syrian concessions--allowing the American Cultural Center to reopen, for example--have been halfhearted and more than offset by revelations of continued Syrian proliferation efforts and its facilitation of terror.[30] Nor does it appear that Tehran and Damascus have loosened their relations. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has met Syrian president Bashar Assad repeatedly, most recently last month in Turkey.[31]
Welcoming Syrian foreign minister Walid al-Muallim to
Meanwhile, successful
ON JANUARY 29, 2001, THE ISRAELI NAVY SEIZED TWO CONTAINERS OF WEAPONS, REPORTEDLY OFFLOADED IN WATERTIGHT CONTAINERS BY THE CALYPSO, A LEBANESE ARMS-SMUGGLING SHIP.
ON MAY 7, 2001, THE ISRAELI NAVY SEIZED THE SANTORINI WHILE IT WAS ON ITS FOURTH ARMS-SMUGGLING
ON JANUARY 3, 2002, THE ISRAELI NAVY INTERCEPTED THE KARINE-A, A GAZA-BOUND FREIGHTER, WHILE IT WAS ON THE
ON MAY 20, 2003, THE ISRAELI NAVY INTERCEPTED THE ABU HASSAN, A FISHING VESSEL CARRYING WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, AND DETONATORS.[34]
ON JANUARY 19-20, 2009, THE
ON NOVEMBER 4, 2009, THE ISRAELI NAVY INTERCEPTED THE FRANCOP, AN ANTIGUA-FLAGGED VESSEL THAT WAS ALLEGEDLY CARRYING THREE HUNDRED TONS OF IRANIAN WEAPONRY TO HEZBOLLAH.[36]
The importance of
The Danger of
Recent reports that Iran transshipped gas masks and chemical weapons through Syria to Hezbollah should only heighten concern as the Islamic Republic increases its defiance in international discussions about its nuclear activities.[42] Across the U.S. political spectrum, analysts agree that, should Israel, the United States, or any other power strike at Iran's nuclear facilities, the Islamic Republic would respond, at least in part, by activating its proxy terrorist networks. Palestinian groups in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and foreign fighters in Iraq all have Syrian support in common.[43] Not only Hezbollah's rhetoric but also its track record suggest a willingness to attack Western targets, should war against Iran erupt.
Given both the circumstances and the stakes, it is ironic that
Michael Rubin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
Notes
1.Middle East Media Research Institute, "Iranian Parliament Speaker: The Blood of Khomeini Rages in Nasrallah's Veins; The Confrontation Is Not Only in Lebanon, but Deep Inside Occupied Palestine and within the Range of the Lion Clubs of Hizbullah . . . No Place in Israel Will Be Safe," Special Dispatch 1210, July 21, 2006, available at www.memri.org/ report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1749.htm (accessed December 14, 2009).
2."Enemies Working to Eliminate the Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult," Partow-e Sokhan, in Persian, December 13, 2006, in Open Source Center IAP20061220011007.
3.Yoav Stern, "Report: Hezbollah's New
4.Quoted in Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah," Ash-Sharq al-Awsat (
5.U.S. Department of State, "State Sponsors of Terrorism," Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 (
6.Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."
7.Ibid.
8.Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the
9.Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."
10.Mehdi Khalaji, "
11.Robert Pape, Dying to Win (
12.Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Hizbullah Attacks along
13.Patrick Devenny, "Hezbollah's Strategic Threat to
14.Efraim Inbar, "How
15.Nadia Abou El-Magd, "For the Majority of Arabs, Hezbollah Won,
16.Robert G. Rabil, "Has Hezbollah's Rise Come at
17.Warren Christopher, "Fighting Terrorism: Challenges for the Peacemakers" (Soref Symposium, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), available at www.washingtoninstitute.org/ templateC07.php?CID=69 (accessed December 11, 2009).
18.Scott Wilson, "Lebanese Wary of a Rising Hezbollah,"
19.Josef Hufelschulte, "Neue feuerkraft für Hisbollah" [New Fire Power for Hezbollah], Focus (
20.Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."
21."Konteynırda silahları" [Weapons Container], Hürriyet (
22.Matthew Levitt, "The New Lebanon: Democratic Reform and State Sponsorship" (PolicyWatch 1016,
23.European Union, "Acts Adopted under Title V of the EU Treaty," Official Journal of the European Union L 61/49 (February 28, 2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:061:0049:0055:EN:PDF (accessed December 11, 2009).
24.House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror: Threatening U.S. Security, Global Stability, and Regional Peace, 109th Cong., 1st sess., February 16, 2005.
25.Ibid.
26."Iran Expands Its Palestinian Control; Offers al-Khadoumi Five Million Dollars," Al-Watan (Kuwait), December 13, 2004, quoted in House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror: Threatening U.S. Security, Global Stability, and Regional Peace.
27.Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."
28.Erich Follath, "Breakthrough in Tribunal Investigation: New Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder," Der Spiegel Online, May 23, 2009, available at www.spiegel.de/international/ world/0,1518,626412,00.html (accessed December 14, 2009).
29.Seymour M. Hersh, "
30."IAEA Inspects Nuclear Research Reactor in
31. "Ahmadinejad ba ra'is jomhuri-ye Suriya didar kard" [Ahmadinejad Meets with the President of the
32."Ahmadinejad: Regional Conditions in
33.Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to
34.Shaul Shay, The Axis of Evil:
35. "
36."Israel Navy Chief: Hezbollah-Bound Iran Ship Carried Hundreds of Tons of Arms," Haaretz.com (Tel Aviv), November 4, 2009, available at www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ 1125807.html (accessed December 14, 2009).
37."
38.See, for example, Barbara Slavin, "How Bush Saved Iran's Neocons," Foreign Policy (November 2007).
39."Tehran Proud to Support Hamas, Hezbollah," PressTV.ir, May 25, 2009, available at www.presstv.ir/ detail.aspx?id=95985 (accessed December 7, 2009).
40.Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh, "Iran's Hidden Revolution," New York Times, June 17, 2009, available at www.aei.org/ article/100635.
41."
42."Hezbollah Silent over Report that Group Got Chemical Weapons," Daily Star (
43.Brian Fishman, ed., Bombers, Bank Accounts & Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of