Obama: We want to strengthen Lebanese armed forces…

yalibnan.

U.S. President Barack Obama for the first time has met Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. Their discussions at the White House on Monday focused largely on efforts to prevent another outbreak of violence between Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon.

President Obama said that what happens in Lebanon has an impact far beyond its borders

Source: Dalati & Nohra

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“Obviously, Lebanon is a critical country in a critical region,” said President Obama. “And we want to do everything we can to encourage a strong, independent and democratic Lebanon.”

He said he spoke with President Suleiman about the implementation of a United Nations Security Council Resolution passed in 2006 that was intended to end fighting between Israeli and Hezbollah forces in Lebanon.

Mr. Obama said there has been progress, but not enough. He noted that while there might be differences between Washington and Beirut on the situation in the region, the two see eye-to-eye on the best approach.

“President Suleiman and I are not going to agree on every issue with respect to how Israel, Lebanon, the Palestinians, Syria are interacting,” said Mr. Obama. “What we do share is a commitment to resolve these issues through dialogue and negotiations as opposed to through violence.”

During their talks at the White House, President Suleiman urged the Obama administration to put more pressure on Israel. President Obama said the Israelis have reason to be worried about arms transfers to Hezbollah.

“President Suleiman emphasized his concerns with respect to Israel,” said President Obama. “I want to be clear that I emphasized to him our concerns about the extensive arms that are smuggled into Lebanon that potentially serve as a threat to Israel.”

Hezbollah has argued that it needs arms because the Lebanese government is incapable of protecting the country. As a result, President Suleiman was expected to urge the Obama administration to speed up delivery of weapons to the Lebanese army.

President Obama gave no guarantees in public. But he did talk in general terms about the importance of military aid to Lebanon.

“We want to strengthen Lebanese armed forces so that they can help to secure the sovereignty and the territory of Lebanon,” said Mr. Obama.

Mr. Obama alluded to a Lebanese cedar tree that was planted on the White House grounds 30 years ago. He said it is strong and thriving, and represents the friendship between the two countries.

Source: VOA

http://www.yalibnan.com/2009/12/15/obama-we-want-to-strengthen-lebanese-armed-forces/

Note:  Can it get any worse?  Oh, I'm sure it can, very shortly!  Bee Sting

Hezbollah's Penance: The Shiite Militia Works to Rebuild its Tarnished Image

TheWeeklyStandard.com

BY David Schenker

March 5, 2010 4:00 PM

Last week in Damascus, just days after the highest ranking visit from a U.S. official in years, Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted a state dinner for his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmedinajad. Welcoming Ahmedinajad so close on the heels of the U.S. diplomatic good will gesture was a pointed Syrian slight to the Obama administration, but the icing on the cake was Assad’s other guest of honor at the feast: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

For Damascus and Tehran—the last two U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East—Hezbollah has long constituted a strategic asset and a point of pride. More recently, the organization successfully worked to broaden its appeal throughout the region. And indeed, after the Shiite terrorist organization fought Israel to a standstill in 2006, Hezbollah’s stature in the Arab world skyrocketed. Not only was Nasrallah the most compelling Arabic orator, Hezbollah became the most positive personification of Shiites in the largely Sunni Muslim region.

That was 2006. Today, while Hezbollah remains a formidable “resistance” force, in the past two years, a number of setbacks have tarnished the organization’s carefully cultivated image in Lebanon and the broader Arab world. Hezbollah’s military prowess may not be in doubt, but now for the first time, Lebanese and other Middle Easterners are starting to question the organization’s once unscrupulous morality. Nearly three decades after its establishment, the resistance has institutionalized and bureaucratized, and Hezbollah is starting to resemble other, corrupt Lebanese organizations.

The problems of the Party of God, Hezbollah's English translation, started in May 2008, when the militia violated its cardinal rule and turned its weapons—allegedly intended for use against Israel—on Lebanese citizens, when the organization invaded Beirut. Continuing this trend, three months later the militia opened fire (accidentally, Hezbollah says) on a Lebanese army helicopter, killing the co-pilot. Then, in November 2008, a 49-member Hezbollah cell was arrested in Egypt, accused of plotting attacks against Israeli tourists and Suez Canal shipping. (Nasrallah responded to the arrests by publicly calling on Egyptians to topple their government).

Setbacks continued into 2009. First came a damaging report in the May edition of Der Spiegel, implicating the militia in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri. (These allegations were recently confirmed by Le Monde). A month later, the heavily favored militia lost the Lebanese elections to its pro-West rivals.

Adding insult to injury, less than a week after its defeat at the polls, the organization was dealt yet another blow, when mass demonstrations erupted in Iran protesting the fraudulent elections. The rallies challenged Iran’s clerical leadership and its controversial doctrine of velayat-e faqih (Islamic government), threatening the seat of power of Hezbollah’s spiritual leader and financial patron Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

As if this weren’t enough, in September 2009 one of the militia’s chief local financiers, Salah Ezzedin, went bankrupt in a Ponzi scheme, ala Bernard Madoff. Ezzedin, who had promised rates of return up to 80 percent, ended up swindling 10,000 Lebanese Shiites out of an estimated $300 million.

Among the setbacks of the past two years, the Ezzedin scandal was perhaps the most damaging to Hezbollah because the militia’s leadership was so close to the disgraced financier, a relationship that led many investors to trust him with their money. (Indeed, Ezzedin named his publishing house after Nasrallah’s son, Hadi, who was killed by Israel in 1997). The Ezzedin affair implicated Hezbollah in the same kind of corruption it routinely accused the pro-West Sunni Government in Beirut of perpetrating.

Recognizing the implications for the organization’s reputation, Hezbollah went into damage-control mode. Nasrallah repeatedly denied any connection to the affair, claiming that the party itself lost $4 million. According to the Arabic news service Elaph, he also instructed Hezbollah clerics to issue a “fatwa-like” directive forbidding the mention of the militia in connection to the scandal, lest it provide fodder for Israeli and American propaganda machines to further “besmirch the organization’s name.”

But the damage was already done. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s long suffering detractors were giddy with schadenfreude; meanwhile, many of the organization’s supporters expressed profound disappointment.

One article in the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily Al-Akbar, written by the paper’s editor Ibrahim al Amin shortly after the scandal broke, provides a good picture of the sentiment of Hezbollah’s base. Al Amin accused the organization of going soft after decades of hardship and of starting to live the good life corrupted by “greed.” This cultured lifestyle, he wrote, was “in opposition to the principle of sacrifice” that once was the hallmark of the resistance. Ending with a flourish, al Amin cited the famed Israeli Ministry of Defense advisor on Lebanon, Uri Lubrani, who long ago said that Israel would only defeat Hezbollah “when it became infected with the virus of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon, in other words, when it alters its appearance and becomes bourgeoisie.”

It’s less clear how this scandal and other Hezbollah missteps are impacting the organization’s standing throughout the Arab world. While much of the regional polling is unreliable, it does reveal some trends. Pew polls taken in 2007 and 2009 indicate consistently high levels of Shiite confidence in Nasrallah, reaching 97 percent in 2009. During this same two year period, however, Sunni Muslim confidence in Seyyid Hasan dropped from an already low 9 percent to 2 percent. (The same 2009 poll showed a decline from 2007 in favorable views of the organization among Egyptians, Jordanians, and Palestinians). Other polls of Arabs also suggest a decline in support. According to polls conducted by Zogby International, in 2008 Nasrallah was the top vote-getter (at 27 percent) when Arabs were asked about their most admired foreign leader. In 2009—even prior to the Ezzedin affair—he only received 11 percent

Although difficult to prove, both based on the public opinion polling and anecdotal evidence, it appears that the last two years have undercut some of Hezbollah’s hard-won currency in the region. Of course, public opinion is fickle, and there is little doubt that the militia’s popularity would increase if another round of fighting erupted between the organization and Israel. During the summer war of 2006, for example, over a 33-day period, Hezbollah’s al-Manar satellite station viewership soared from 38 in the rankings into the top ten.

Still, recent actions by Hezbollah suggest that the organization is concerned with its image in Lebanon and the Arab world. In November, two months after the scandal broke, for example, Nasrallah changed the topic and published a new Hezbollah “manifesto,” updating the 1985 charter. Like the previous document, the 2009 manifesto spelled out its enmity toward Israel and the United States. At the same time, though, the new charter sought to appeal to a broader Sunni audience by downplaying the organization’s historic allegiance to the clerical leadership in Tehran. Likewise, rather than urging Lebanese Christians to convert—“We call upon you to embrace Islam” read the 1985 manifesto—in 2009, Hezbollah adopted more conciliatory language toward its fellow countrymen.

Likewise, in December, to counter the growing impression of Hezbollah corruption, Nasrallah gave a speech promoting (of all things) adherence to Lebanese laws, including respecting traffic signals, paying for—and not stealing—Government water and electricity, abiding by building laws and civil codes, ending smuggling that undercuts Lebanese businesses, and emphasizing the importance of civil servants showing up for their jobs and actually performing their duties

This past February, the resistance really put the spin machine into full gear. First, in a speech during “Martyred Leaders Week,” Nasrallah—in an obvious bid to regain his standing with the Arab street—pledged that during the next war with Israel, Hezbollah would go toe-to-toe with Israel, threatening to “bomb Ben Gurion airport,” if the Jewish state targeted Beirut International.

Then, following the martyrs speech, Hezbollah’s website published a bazaar interview with Lebanese “economists” claiming that by establishing a credible deterrent threat, the Shiite militia had actually “improved [the] economic situation in Lebanon,” particularly the performance of the Beirut Stock Exchange. Not coincidentally, at about the same time, Al-Akbar publicized a poll by the pro-Hezbollah Beirut Center for Research and Information, indicating that 84 percent of Lebanese “trust the resistances’ capabilities facing any Israeli attack.”

The final piece of the puzzle in Hezbollah’s effort to rehabilitate its image at home and abroad is compensation for the victims of the Ezzedin Ponzi scheme. Because Hezbollah was so close to the financier, swindled Shiites—most of whom are supporters of the resistance—are petitioning the organization for financial restitution. And it’s not only the Lebanese. According to reports in the Arab press, several leading figures in Syria’s Assad regime, including Assad’s brother Maher and Vice President Farouk Shara’a also lost their investments, and are looking to Hezbollah—which captured Ezzedin on the lam with suitcases of cash in hand—to recoup some 17 million euros.

Not surprisingly, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyasa reported on February 28 that some time ago Nasrallah had contacted Supreme Leader Khamenei, requesting $300 million in funding to stave off a “crisis of confidence” among his constituents. Khamenei approved the appeal, and according to Al-Siyasa, the funds were transferred to Nasrallah by Ahmedinajad when they met in Damascus last week.

With money in hand, Hezballah will be able to placate its supporters. By threatening Israel, the militia may even be able to again generate some buzz in the Arab world. What the last two years have demonstrated, however, is that if the “resistance” isn’t resisting (i.e., actively fighting) Israel, the Arab world has little use for the militia, particularly if it is attacking Sunnis at home and subverting Arab regimes abroad.

During the dinner in Damascus for Ahmedinajad and Nasrallah last week, Assad pledged his regime’s continued backing for Hezbollah. “To support the resistance is a moral, patriotic and legal duty,” he said. Four years after the last war with Israel and a following a string of Hezbollah miscues, although the Shiite militia dominates Lebanese politics, Assad’s sentiments today appear to be shared by a minority of Middle Easterners. While the organization is making great efforts to reverse the tide, absent another war with Israel, the decline of Arab support for Hezbollah is a regional trend that’s likely to continue.

David Schenker is Aufzien Fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

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Hezbollah is not the IRA.

Friday, February 5, 2010

MIDDLE EAST AND TERRORISM.COM

by Tony Badran

Islamist groups have invited a whole set of analogies purportedly aimed at better explaining them and how best to deal with them. One such analogy that has gained currency in recent years is the oft-encountered comparison between Islamist groups and the Irish Republican Army.

The point of the comparison is to show that as the IRA was purportedly co-opted through dialogue, the same method can be applied to other armed organizations as well. Hence, the argument runs, only such a peaceful process, and not military coercion, will lead to any given group’s decision to abandon violence, and ultimately to disarm and integrate into democratic politics. Of course, forsaking violence is not a prerequisite for dialogue, and engagement is further facilitated by a nifty conceit distinguishing a group’s “military wing” from its ostensibly more moderate or pragmatic “political wing.” Indeed, the British are currently pursuing this policy with Hezbollah – and going nowhere.

The argument has just been trotted out again in a rather fantastical and factually handicapped piece by Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson on the Foreign Affairs website.

The two authors get off to a sound start, noting a major difference between the IRA and Hezbollah, namely the organic ties between the Party of God and Iran, which have no parallel in the IRA. However, when they elide that inconvenient fact and nonetheless claim that “the similarities between the two cases are no less striking than the differences,” their argument goes off the tracks.

One “similarity,” they contend, is that both Hezbollah and the IRA have “political wings.” But this is misleading, not least of all because Hezbollah rejects and ridicules the proposition that it has a “political wing” separate from a “military” one.

Even if everyone knew that the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, were separate only in name, Sinn Fein’s leaders still tried to deny any organizational links or knowledge of IRA operations. But that’s not how Hezbollah works. For instance, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times last spring, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general, Naim Qassem, dismissed the supposed dichotomy outright. “All political, social and jihad work is tied to the decisions of this leadership,” he said. “The same leadership that directs the parliamentary and government work also leads jihad actions.”

In other words, far from being ready to “shift more decisively to the political realm,” as Simon and Stevenson contend, Hezbollah sees involvement in politics as serving its broader, regional, agenda: “resistance.”

It’s bad enough to misunderstand Hezbollah, but to make the case that engagement in peaceful dialogue is what leads to moderation and disarmament is to distort the historical record regarding the IRA as well. The British did not bring the IRA “in from the cold” through peaceful talks with its “political wing.” Rather they forced them to the table after infiltrating their ranks and cultivating informers even in the top echelons of the movement. Information from these informers was secretly passed to Loyalist paramilitary forces who used it to target IRA members extra-judicially.

In the end, the IRA was cornered, unable to force a British withdrawal, and, worse, unable to even protect its community from Loyalist gangs. It was not the Brits but the IRA that initiated talks when its armed struggle had reached a stalemate.

This is hardly where Hezbollah sees itself today, neither ideologically nor operationally. Instead of finding itself cornered by its local rivals, Hezbollah has used its weapons to extract powerful political concessions, neutralize the unfavorable result of democratic elections, and impose its priorities on its adversaries and the Lebanese government.

Why is Simon and Stevenson’s article riddled with so many errors and misconceptions? Because they assume an affirmative response to a key question that they never bother tackling: Does Hezbollah want to disarm? Without addressing this question convincingly, further misconceptions are inevitable, like the authors’ proposition, unsupported by any evidence, that Hezbollah is trying to distance itself from Iran, whose Ruling Jurist (Wali al-Faqih), as Hezbollah itself declares, has final say over all important decisions. The proper answer of course is that Hezbollah does not want to disarm since it makes no sense for it to do so, neither from a pragmatic perspective nor an ideological one.

The issue here is not sloppiness, but a chronic ailment afflicting Western writing on the Middle East, as what appears to be analysis is often something else entirely. Simon (who was recently in Lebanon at the invitation of the New Opinion Group) and Stevenson are not writing about Hezbollah or Lebanon, but Washington.
In 2003 the two co-wrote an essay arguing that the example of Northern Ireland was “a strong argument” against adopting a “lenient” policy with Hamas, so why do they now argue that such treatment will work with Hezbollah? Perhaps it is because there are figures in the Obama administration who are sympathetic to a policy of engagement with Hezbollah, like the NSC staff’s counterterrorism czar, John Brennan, who has publically implied an acceptance of the “political vs. military wing” dichotomy in Hezbollah, claiming that the “political wing” allegedly denounces the violence of the “military.”

Thankfully, when it comes to Hezbollah, as evident from the State Department’s quick rejection of Brennan’s views, there is more sobriety in Washington than in the poor Foreign Affairs article, or in the British Foreign Office for that matter.


Tony Badran is a research fellow with the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Egypt's decision to wall off Gazan tunnels is being condemned across the Arab world.

Middle East and Terrorism

A Middle Eastern country is building a massive thick steel wall as a barrier between themselves and a Palestinian regime. The country is being condemned for its actions across the Arab world, denounced by Islamist figures like Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, and facing angry demonstrations at its embassies around the world.

Signs with the president’s face daubed with a Star of David are waved, and furious slogans are chanted. The new construction project, written about critically in the world press as “choking” Gaza, has been dubbed the “iron wall” and the “wall of shame.”

Sound familiar? Nothing new? In fact, the situation is very new. The country that is being berated and condemned is not Israel. The wall is being build by the Egyptian government to separate territory controlled by Egypt and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

Israel is routinely charged with inhumanely and heartlessly fencing off Palestinian Gazans in a “prison,” despite the fact that Egypt’s official crossing to Gaza is also clamped shut, with the exception of a few days each month. But with the construction of this new wall, Egypt is taking some powerful hits from within the Arab world.

The wall being constructed is designed to stop the flow of smuggling between Egypt and Gaza through the border town of Rafah, an underground economy that is not limited to — but certainly includes — major weaponry and ammunition being stockpiled for terrorist attacks and to help Hamas rearm for the next war between Gaza and Israel. Along with the weaponry brought in to replace the stockpiles decimated in Operation Cast Lead, millions of dollars worth of other commerce flows through the tunnels on a daily basis. Everything from food, to gasoline, to machinery, to farm animals. The tunnels are a major source of revenue for Hamas, which charges a premium for the construction and use of the tunnels and puts a tariff on any goods that are brought in.

The planned 10 kilometer-long wall will include steel sheets that will reach 60 meters underground — an attempt to cut off the tunnels and the commerce that flourishes there. In addition to weaponry, the tunnels are also a conduit for terrorists, both reasons that the tunnels themselves were targeted in Operation Cast Lead.

Construction of the wall began in early December, with the Egyptian government doing its best to keep news of it quiet for as long as possible. By mid-December, it became impossible to hide such a massive project, and news of the construction broke and began to spread. Even as reports began appearing in the media, Egypt refused to acknowledge its existence.

An AP article dramatically described the construction in the same judgmental terms normally reserved for accounts of Israel’s building of barriers:

A jackhammer pounded large steel beams side by side into the sandy soil on the Egyptian side of Gaza’s border, putting in place an underground wall that could shift the balance of power in this volatile area. Once completed, the steel barrier would cut off blockaded Gaza’s last lifeline.

In the wake of the media attention, demonstrations condemning the Egyptian action have ensued, beginning in Jordan, where an organization of unions and professional associations protested construction of the wall. Some 150 people gathered outside the Egyptian embassy in Amman earlier this month and burned photos of President Hosni Mubarak. The photos depict Mubarak with a Star of David stamped on his forehead.

There was a similar scene at the Egyptian embassy in Lebanon, organized by an Islamist party loyal to Hezbollah and Nasrallah. And like the efforts against Israel’s wall, political activity is spreading to Europe, al-Jazeera reported:

A galaxy of Italian human rights organizations and dignitaries warned that the steel wall being built on the Palestinian-Egyptian borders would equalize Egypt with Israel in its blockade on the Gaza Strip.

In a letter to be handed Thursday to the Egyptian ambassador in Rome, the Italian organizations and figures said that Egypt has the right to take measure to protect its borders, but the blockade and starvation of Gaza people would not lead to stability in the region or give Egypt prestige and dignity.

The letter warned that Egypt’s wall would spread hatred between nations and would serve Israel alone, adding that it would cause a deep pain to the free peoples of the world.

Certainly, Egypt is not taking such a controversial measure out of affection for or a desire to protect Israel from Hamas in Gaza. Clearly, it is doing so out of self-interest. The Hamas regime in Gaza may not be as direct a threat to Egypt as they are to Israel, but tied as closely as they are to those who would destabilize the current regime in Egypt and replace it with a fundamentalist Islamist regime, they are far from trusted allies as far as Egypt is concerned. Gaza would be a conveniently located base for groups to organize and launch attacks. (Currently, Egypt is trying 26 men charged with planning attacks inside their country, linked with Hezbollah.) Therefore, Egypt has no interest in seeing Gaza loaded with powerful weaponry.

The most public battleground that the controversy over the wall is being played in is the Islamic religious world. “Dueling fatwas” are being handed down, as clerics loyal to Hezbollah and Hamas and those connected to the Egyptian government argue as to whether the wall deserves the Islamic stamp of approval, or Islamic condemnation. A group of clerics affiliated with the government, the Islamic Research Council of Al-Azhar University, declared:

It is one of Egypt’s legitimate rights to place a barrier that prevents the harm from the tunnels under Rafah, which are used to smuggle drugs and other (contraband) that threaten Egypt’s stability. … Those who oppose building this wall are violating the commands of Islamic law.

A harsh backlash ensued in the wake of this ruling — led by clerics from inside Al-Azhar itself and then echoed by other Arab clerics. For now, officials like Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu-al-Ghayt are continuing to do their best to avoid addressing the issue when asked by reporters about the steel wall. Sounding defensive, the Egyptian minister declared:

Constructions Egypt is carrying out is to defend itself and defend its national security. This means the right of self-defense. … The secrets of the Egyptian state will not be material discussed on satellite TVs or the press.

The wall critics accuse Egypt of taking the step to placate the United States. Egypt’s blind eye to the smuggling activity has been costly in terms of its relationship with the United States, jeopardizes the millions of dollars in aid received by the regime, and has cast doubt as to whether Egypt can play the broker role it seeks in the Mideast peace process.

Cynics suggest that Egypt is playing for maximum advantage by building a wall to please the Americans and Israelis now. Later, once it is completed, there will be a wink to Hamas as they quickly construct new tunnel routes circumventing the wall, which will presumably silence the criticism in Islamist circles and allow Egypt to continue its tightrope act — balancing Western diplomatic respectability and Middle Eastern street credibility.

Allison Kaplan Sommer

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Hezbollah denies drug trafficking to fund Israel attacks

Haaretz.com byDPA

The Lebanese-based militant organization Hezbollah on Tuesday denied reports issued that it was trafficking drugs to Europe in order to fund activities against Israel.

Der Spiegel reported last week that the German police arrested two Lebanese nationals residing in the country in October 2009 for allegedly transferring large sums of money to a family in Lebanon reportedly connected to Hezbollah.

In a statement on Tuesday, Hezbollah deemed the magazine "morally and

legally responsible for the false fabrications it issued against the party." The movement called on Der Spiegel's management "not to be a cheap tool manipulated by the Zionist entity to cover up for its crimes in Lebanon and Palestine." Hezbollah also called on the magazine "to be a true reflection of reality that reveals the injustice suffered by the Lebanese and Palestinian people." Note: Photo of Hezbollah added by BeeSting

The Enduring Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Axis Part I

Friday, December 18, 2009

The Enduring Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Axis Part I

by Michael Rubin

1st part of 2

The Obama administration would like to move Syria into the camp of more moderate Arab states, but there is scant evidence that Syria is willing to give up its support for terrorist organizations. Like Iran, it remains a destabilizing and dangerous force in the region.

Key points in this Outlook:

* The Lebanese and Israeli border is calmer today than during the 2006 war, but the potential for regional conflict is great.

* Both the Syrian and Iranian governments have used Hezbollah to conduct proxy warfare against Israel.

* The Obama administration has tried to move Syria from a rejectionist state into the more moderate Arab camp, but there is no evidence that the engagement policy has worked.

The 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel took not only outside observers by surprise, but also Israel and the government of Lebanon. A day after an operation in which Hezbollah killed five Israeli soldiers and captured two others, the Israel Defense Forces struck Lebanese targets as far north as Beirut. Over subsequent days, the Israeli Air Force bombed Hezbollah-controlled neighborhoods in Beirut and struck targets in the country's

north. U.S., European, and Arab diplomats scrambled to prevent the spread of hostilities.

While Arab governments remained conspicuously silent, unwilling to support Hezbollah publicly, if at all, Iranian authorities egged on the militia. Speaking six days after the war began, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, the speaker of Iran's parliament, declared, "To Hassan Nasrallah [Hezbollah's secretary general] we say, well done. This religious scholar roars like a lion, and the blood of Imam [Ruhollah] Khomeini rages in his veins."[1] Iran's supreme leader encouraged Hezbollah to keep fighting. According to Nasrallah, Ali Khamenei sent him a letter two days after the war began, which stated, "You have a hard war ahead, but if you resist, you will triumph."[2]

United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1701 restored calm, but only a tenuous one. While the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) returned to Lebanon, it failed to prevent the resupply of Hezbollah with an arsenal even more advanced than before the 2006 conflict. The Lebanese and Israeli border may be calm today, but the potential for regional conflict has only grown. If a new conflict erupts, it likely will be deadlier and harder to contain to Israel and Lebanon. Hezbollah now possesses missiles capable of striking not only Haifa, but also Tel Aviv.[3]

The Obama administration, meanwhile, has reached out diplomatically to both Syria and Iran in the belief that a less confrontational approach to conflict resolution might lead the two states to reconsider their rejectionist behavior. It has not worked. While Tehran and Damascus may welcome the incentives inherent in U.S. engagement, both states continue to use proxies to pursue radical aims and undercut stability. Iran may be Hezbollah's chief patron, but Syria is the lynchpin that makes Iranian support for foreign fighters possible. While Israel may be the immediate target of the Iran-Syria nexus, the partnership threatens broader U.S. interests.

A Proxy Is Born

Hezbollah formed against the backdrop of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon as an Iranian proxy. Ali Mohtashimi, Iran's ambassador to Syria from 1982 to 1985, discussed the group's beginnings in an interview with the Iranian newspaper Shargh on August 3, 2008:

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini changed his mind about sending large forces to Syria and Lebanon. . . . I was really worried about Syria and Lebanon. I went to Tehran and met with Ayatollah Khomeini. As I was worried about Lebanon and enthusiastic about the idea of sending forces to Syria and Lebanon, I started talking about our responsibilities and what was going on in Lebanon. The imam cooled me down and said the forces we send to Syria and Lebanon would need huge logistical support. . . . The only remaining way is to train the Shi'a men there, and so Hezbollah was born.[4]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) supported the new group as it fought or co-opted other Shia militias in southern Lebanon. The Iranian government is not shy about credit. On May 14, 2009, the London-based pan-Arab daily Ash-Sharq al-Awsat published an interview with Mohammad Hassan Akhtari, the Islamic Republic's ambassador to Syria from 1986 to 1997, and again from 2005 through 2007.

Correspondent Manal Lufti described Akhtari as "the operational father" of Hezbollah, "engineer of the special relationship" between Syria and Iran, and "coordinator of Iran's relations with Palestinian organizations in Damascus," groups listed annually as terrorist organizations in the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism.[5] Indeed, according to Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, "the Iranian embassy in Damascus became the most important Ira-nian embassy in the world. It represented something akin to a 'regional center' for Iran's diplomatic activities that extended from Damascus to Beirut and the Palestinian territories and became privy to files on several matters, chief of which was Iran's relations with Syria, Hezbollah, [and] the Palestinian organizations."[6]

Iran and Syria worked jointly to unify the Shia who, through the early 1980s, were divided between Amal and Hezbollah. Akhtari described how he and Ghazi Kanaan, the Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon, met over months to manage reconciliation, which ultimately led to the victory of Hezbollah, the more religious of the two groups.[7] While Syria cultivated a reputation for secularism among many Western academics, Akhtari describes a different regime.[8] "The late President Hafiz al-Asad trusted Ayatollah Khomeini and respected him. He was one of those who believed that any opposition to the Islamic Republic in any shape or form and under whatever pretext amounted to treason to the Arab, Islamic, and Palestinian causes."[9] By 1988, Hezbollah was the dominant force not only in southern Lebanon, where it painted itself as the vanguard of resistance against Israel's occupation, but also in Beirut, which would remain under Syrian occupation for the next seventeen years.

Hezbollah thrived under Syrian occupation. Both the Syrian and Iranian governments used Hezbollah to conduct proxy warfare against Israel. Symbolism is important in the Middle East. In April 2001, when Nasrallah met Khamenei, Nasrallah kissed Khamenei's hand, symbolizing fealty.[10] In the decade before Israel's 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah conducted more than three dozen suicide attacks against Israeli forces in Lebanon.[11] Between Israel's withdrawal and the eruption of war between Israel and Lebanon, Hezbollah conducted twenty-one additional operations against Israel itself.[12]

The Syrian government not only turned a blind eye toward the group's activities in Lebanon as Hezbollah systematically worked to undercut that state's sovereignty, but also facilitated a supply of Iranian missiles to Hezbollah. As Patrick Devenny, Henry M. Jackson National Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., noted in a prescient article six months before the 2006 war, "The Hezbollah missile threat to Israel has expanded not only in quantity but also in quality. In recent years, the group's operational artillery reach has grown. Experts and analysts generally put the Hezbollah rocket force somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 missiles. The heart of this arsenal remains rooted in Hezbollah's massive stocks--perhaps 7,000 to 8,000--of 107mm and 122mm Katyusha rockets, virtually all of which were supplied directly from existing Iranian army stocks."[13]

The Israel Defense Forces' failure to eradicate Hezbollah in the 2006 war led many analysts to declare Hezbollah the victor.[14] Hezbollah had survived Israel's onslaught and become the first Arab entity to hit Haifa since Israel's founding in 1948.[15] Robert G. Rabil, director of graduate studies at Florida Atlantic University and a well-regarded Syria and Lebanon analyst, went further, suggesting that Hezbollah's rise may have come at Syria's expense.[16]

Michael Rubin

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors../..

The Enduring Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Axis. Part II

by Michael Rubin

2nd part of 2

Is Syria Still Important?

Syria enabled Hezbollah's rise. It became the transit point for Iranian arms. In addition, Syria provided crucial safe haven for offices, personnel, and organization, not only for Hezbollah, but also for Palestinian terror groups and, since 2003, Islamist terrorists operating in Iraq. Through it all, Iranian support has been key.

In a 1996 speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, then-secretary of state Warren Christopher noted that Iran provides significant financial assistance to many terrorist groups that maintain offices in Lebanon. "Iran has not stopped at rhetoric. It meets frequently with all the major terrorist groups--including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command]. . . . It provides them with money--up to several million dollars a year in the case of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others, and up to $100 million a year for Hezbollah alone. Iran also supplies them with arms and material support, training, and--in some cases--operational guidance."[17] More recently, Western diplomats in Lebanon estimate that Iranian assistance to Hezbollah is closer to $200 million annually.[18]

The arms trade continues through Syria. As the German military prepared to enforce the prohibition on Hezbollah resupply under terms of its UNIFIL mandate, the German news magazine Focus reported on October 9, 2006, that Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) had concluded that the Islamic Republic had already resupplied missiles to Hezbollah in the aftermath of the war. The BND reported that the resupply had occurred over land through Syria.[19] In 2008, Akhtari estimated that the volume of total trade ranged from $2.5 to $3 billion.[20] While illegal arms are but a tiny fraction of that figure, such trade traditionally provides cover for arms transfers. On May 29, 2007, for example, a Turkish train carrying construction supplies from Iran to Syria hit a mine allegedly laid by a Kurdish terrorist group and derailed. Police discovered an undeclared cache of Iranian arms, including rocket launchers and rifles.[21] The Turkish route into Syria may become more important as Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoˇgan tightens relations with both Tehran and Damascus. Regardless, Iranian cargo planes land frequently at Damascus International Airport.[22] Suspicion over their role in the illicit weapons trade led the European Union to sanction Iran Air Cargo.[23]

Hezbollah is not the only recipient of Iranian largesse on Syrian territory. Matthew Levitt, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) terror and financial analyst, noted in congressional testimony that estimates of Iranian assistance to Hamas ranged between $20 million and $50 million each year through the 1990s.[24] Much of this money was and still is channeled through Hezbollah.[25] Upon Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's death in 2004, for example, Iranian intelligence reportedly channeled $22 million through Hezbollah to fund Palestinian terrorist groups more sympathetic to the Iranian line.[26]

The assassination of Hezbollah terrorist Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus highlights the crucial role Syria plays in international terrorism, regardless of its diplomatic posturing. On February 12, 2008, a car bomb in Damascus killed Mughniyeh, a fixture on the FBI's most-wanted list until his death. In the wake of Mughniyeh's death, Akhtari's comments highlighted the importance of Syria in the terror nexus. "We trust Syria," the Iranian ambassador explained. "It is their concern more than ours because Mughniyeh was their guest in Damascus and, of course, because of the close relations between Hezbollah and Syria."[27] Indeed, Hezbollah agents may do Syria and Iran's dirty work, not only against Israel and Western forces in Iraq, but also against Lebanon itself. A lengthy UN investigation of the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri appears ready to finger Hezbollah as the trigger party.[28]

Syria Remains Pivotal

Desire to make progress on the Middle East peace process, unravel the Syria-Iran axis, and end Syrian support for terrorism motivates the Obama administration's efforts to flip Syria diplomatically from its role as a rejectionist state into the more moderate camp populated by countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan, which may not always be pro-American in the expression of their foreign policy, but at least keep their support for terrorism indirect and do not countenance Iranian influence.[29]

There is no evidence, however, that the State Department's engagement policy has worked. Syrian concessions--allowing the American Cultural Center to reopen, for example--have been halfhearted and more than offset by revelations of continued Syrian proliferation efforts and its facilitation of terror.[30] Nor does it appear that Tehran and Damascus have loosened their relations. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has met Syrian president Bashar Assad repeatedly, most recently last month in Turkey.[31]

Welcoming Syrian foreign minister Walid al-Muallim to Tehran on November 5, 2009, Ahmadinejad said, "Comprehensive Tehran-Damascus relations keep getting deeper, wiser, and stronger with the passage of each new day, and such relations are not easily subjected to other developments."[32]

Meanwhile, successful U.S. and Israeli interdiction efforts of Iranian arms at high sea, while embarrassing to Iran, have made Syria's role as a route for weapons delivery more important. The last decade has witnessed several high-profile interceptions of weapons:

ON JANUARY 29, 2001, THE ISRAELI NAVY SEIZED TWO CONTAINERS OF WEAPONS, REPORTEDLY OFFLOADED IN WATERTIGHT CONTAINERS BY THE CALYPSO, A LEBANESE ARMS-SMUGGLING SHIP.

ON MAY 7, 2001, THE ISRAELI NAVY SEIZED THE SANTORINI WHILE IT WAS ON ITS FOURTH ARMS-SMUGGLING MISSION. THIS SHIP CARRIED 107MM ROCKETS, MORTARS, ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES, ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILES, AND ANTITANK WEAPONRY.

ON JANUARY 3, 2002, THE ISRAELI NAVY INTERCEPTED THE KARINE-A, A GAZA-BOUND FREIGHTER, WHILE IT WAS ON THE RED SEA. ONBOARD, NAVAL COMMANDOS FOUND FIFTY TONS OF SOPHISTICATED IRANIAN WEAPONRY.[33]

ON MAY 20, 2003, THE ISRAELI NAVY INTERCEPTED THE ABU HASSAN, A FISHING VESSEL CARRYING WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, AND DETONATORS.[34]

ON JANUARY 19-20, 2009, THE U.S. NAVY INTERCEPTED THE MONCHEGORSK, AN IRANIAN FREIGHTER CARRYING MILITARY SUPPLIES TO SYRIA IN VIOLATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1559.[35]

ON NOVEMBER 4, 2009, THE ISRAELI NAVY INTERCEPTED THE FRANCOP, AN ANTIGUA-FLAGGED VESSEL THAT WAS ALLEGEDLY CARRYING THREE HUNDRED TONS OF IRANIAN WEAPONRY TO HEZBOLLAH.[36]

The importance of Syria grows as authorities in Tehran make clear their commitment to support Hezbollah and Palestinian groups, which the United States considers terrorists. When Ahmadinejad visited Damascus last spring, he met with the leaders of Damascus-based terrorist groups and promised them continued support.[37] Less than three weeks later, Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament whom some American journalists dub a pragmatist,[38] declared, "We are proud to defend Hamas and Hezbollah. We are not trying to hide it. They are fighters in the path of God, and you can call them whatever you like," adding that the idea that Tehran would ever abandon the two groups was a "U.S. dream."[39]

The Danger of Syria's Safe Haven

Syria's continued support for terrorists and other foreign fighters undermines any diplomatic gains the United States achieves. Because of Syria, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has failed to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament. Meanwhile, the IRGC has more political power now than at any previous point in its history.[40] As such, statements by its commander that "in the near future, we will witness the destruction of Israel, the aggressor, this cancerous microbe Israel, at the able hands of the soldiers of the community of Hezbollah," should raise concerns in Washington and European capitals about the possibility of a regional conflagration.[41]

Recent reports that Iran transshipped gas masks and chemical weapons through Syria to Hezbollah should only heighten concern as the Islamic Republic increases its defiance in international discussions about its nuclear activities.[42] Across the U.S. political spectrum, analysts agree that, should Israel, the United States, or any other power strike at Iran's nuclear facilities, the Islamic Republic would respond, at least in part, by activating its proxy terrorist networks. Palestinian groups in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and foreign fighters in Iraq all have Syrian support in common.[43] Not only Hezbollah's rhetoric but also its track record suggest a willingness to attack Western targets, should war against Iran erupt.

Given both the circumstances and the stakes, it is ironic that U.S. officials continue to accept the fiction of Syrian sincerity. As difficult as stopping terrorist supplies may be, the likelihood that proxy groups will voluntarily forfeit their capability is low, and the cost of allowing terrorists to use such arms is high.

Michael Rubin

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Notes

1.Middle East Media Research Institute, "Iranian Parliament Speaker: The Blood of Khomeini Rages in Nasrallah's Veins; The Confrontation Is Not Only in Lebanon, but Deep Inside Occupied Palestine and within the Range of the Lion Clubs of Hizbullah . . . No Place in Israel Will Be Safe," Special Dispatch 1210, July 21, 2006, available at www.memri.org/ report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1749.htm (accessed December 14, 2009).

2."Enemies Working to Eliminate the Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult," Partow-e Sokhan, in Persian, December 13, 2006, in Open Source Center IAP20061220011007.

3.Yoav Stern, "Report: Hezbollah's New Missiles Have Range 'Israel Can't Fathom,'" Haaretz (Tel Aviv), August 29, 2008.

4.Quoted in Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah," Ash-Sharq al-Awsat (London), May 18, 2008.

5.U.S. Department of State, "State Sponsors of Terrorism," Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 (Washington, DC, 2009), available at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122436.htm (accessed December 11, 2009); and Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."

6.Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."

7.Ibid.

8.Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), 169-79.

9.Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."

10.Mehdi Khalaji, "Iran's Shadow Government in Lebanon" (PolicyWatch 1124, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2006), available at www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2489 (accessed December 11, 2009).

11.Robert Pape, Dying to Win (New York: Random House, 2005), 265-81.

12.Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Hizbullah Attacks along Israel's Northern Border May 2000-June 2006," June 1, 2006, available at www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/9EE216D7-82EF-4274-B80D-6BBD1803E8A7 (accessed December 11, 2009).

13.Patrick Devenny, "Hezbollah's Strategic Threat to Israel," Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2006).

14.Efraim Inbar, "How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War," Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2007).

15.Nadia Abou El-Magd, "For the Majority of Arabs, Hezbollah Won, Israel Is No Longer the Undefeatable Army," Associated Press, August 18, 2006.

16.Robert G. Rabil, "Has Hezbollah's Rise Come at Syria's Expense?" Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2007).

17.Warren Christopher, "Fighting Terrorism: Challenges for the Peacemakers" (Soref Symposium, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), available at www.washingtoninstitute.org/ templateC07.php?CID=69 (accessed December 11, 2009).

18.Scott Wilson, "Lebanese Wary of a Rising Hezbollah," Washington Post, December 20, 2004.

19.Josef Hufelschulte, "Neue feuerkraft für Hisbollah" [New Fire Power for Hezbollah], Focus (Munich), October 9, 2006.

20.Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."

21."Konteynırda silahları" [Weapons Container], Hürriyet (Istanbul), May 30, 2007.

22.Matthew Levitt, "The New Lebanon: Democratic Reform and State Sponsorship" (PolicyWatch 1016, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 21, 2005), available at www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2346 (accessed December 11, 2009).

23.European Union, "Acts Adopted under Title V of the EU Treaty," Official Journal of the European Union L 61/49 (February 28, 2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:061:0049:0055:EN:PDF (accessed December 11, 2009).

24.House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror: Threatening U.S. Security, Global Stability, and Regional Peace, 109th Cong., 1st sess., February 16, 2005.

25.Ibid.

26."Iran Expands Its Palestinian Control; Offers al-Khadoumi Five Million Dollars," Al-Watan (Kuwait), December 13, 2004, quoted in House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror: Threatening U.S. Security, Global Stability, and Regional Peace.

27.Manal Lufti, "The Making of Hezbollah."

28.Erich Follath, "Breakthrough in Tribunal Investigation: New Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder," Der Spiegel Online, May 23, 2009, available at www.spiegel.de/international/ world/0,1518,626412,00.html (accessed December 14, 2009).

29.Seymour M. Hersh, "Syria, Israel, and the Obama Administration," The New Yorker, April 6, 2009.

30."IAEA Inspects Nuclear Research Reactor in Syria," Agence France Presse, November 17, 2009.

31. "Ahmadinejad ba ra'is jomhuri-ye Suriya didar kard" [Ahmadinejad Meets with the President of the Republic of Syria], Asr-e Iran (Tehran), November 9, 2009.

32."Ahmadinejad: Regional Conditions in Iran's, Syria's Favor," Fars News Agency (Tehran), November 5, 2009.

33.Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, September 24, 2007, available at www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/ 251/ currentpage/6/Default.aspx (accessed December 11, 2009).

34.Shaul Shay, The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and thePalestinian Terror (Edison, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 156.

35. "Cyprus Unloads 'Gaza Arms' Ship," BBC News, February 13, 2009.

36."Israel Navy Chief: Hezbollah-Bound Iran Ship Carried Hundreds of Tons of Arms," Haaretz.com (Tel Aviv), November 4, 2009, available at www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ 1125807.html (accessed December 14, 2009).

37."Iran and Syria Continue to Support Resistance," Gulf News (Abu Dhabi), May 6, 2009.

38.See, for example, Barbara Slavin, "How Bush Saved Iran's Neocons," Foreign Policy (November 2007).

39."Tehran Proud to Support Hamas, Hezbollah," PressTV.ir, May 25, 2009, available at www.presstv.ir/ detail.aspx?id=95985 (accessed December 7, 2009).

40.Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh, "Iran's Hidden Revolution," New York Times, June 17, 2009, available at www.aei.org/ article/100635.

41."Israel to Be Destroyed by Hezbollah," Fars News Agency (Tehran), February 19, 2008.

42."Hezbollah Silent over Report that Group Got Chemical Weapons," Daily Star (Beirut), September 4, 2009.

43.Brian Fishman, ed., Bombers, Bank Accounts & Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq (West Point, NY: Harmony Project, 2008).